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Abstract 
Emanating from Putnam’s two-level game theory of international negotiations, the 
thesis analyse the interplay between the domestic, the supranational and the 
international level in the European Union, when negotiating the Bra War with 
China. The thesis expands Putnam’s theory into a three-level game theory in order 
to better understand the complexity of the European Union. 
The work concludes five main findings about how the Unions position during 
the Bra War should be understood and how the different levels in the negotiations 
have affected the outcome of the negotiations. First, the costs of a no-agreement 
will affect the likelihood of an agreement to be concluded. Second, the power 
relations, both between the levels and within the levels, in the European Union 
affect the outcome of the negotiations. Third, facing a heterogeneous constituency 
at the domestic level will not necessarily reduce the possibility of an agreement at 
the international level, the conclusion to be drawn from the Bra War negotiations 
points at the contrary. Fourth, the three-level structure of the European Union 
gives the interest groups more ways to exert influence. Fifth, the study shows that 
domestic and supranational politics cannot be studied independently from 
international politics. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
In international negotiations the relationship between the international and the 
domestic level is somehow entangled, many political scientist studying 
international negotiations has described this phenomenon (see also: Meunier 
2005, Patterson 1997, Putnam 1988). Adding the supranational dimension, the 
picture becomes even more complex. The thesis is asking the question how these 
three levels are interacting with each other in international negotiations. 
This study sets out to explain the relationship between the three levels of the 
European Union (EU) in international negotiations, in doing so the thesis 
emanates from the so-called Bra War that occurred between the EU and China in 
2005. Choosing the Bra War as case of study has several reasons. First, 
negotiations concerning quotas on textile and clothing (T/C) are interesting 
because the European Community has an exclusive competence, which means 
that the Member States are bound to implement the quotas negotiated by the 
Union. Second, negotiations on trade between the EU and China are negotiations 
between giants: the Union is to day the worlds largest market, and China is one of 
the most rapid growing markets in the world. Third, the EU is divided in how to 
react to the Chinese renaissance. On the one hand the Union wants to get access to 
cheap T/C from China, on the other hand there are powerful interests within the 
Union that want to protect the domestic producers from competition. This division 
helps us understand the Unions strengths and weaknesses when faced wit a 
heterogeneous constituency. 
In order to capture the interaction between the different layers the thesis 
expand Putnam’s two-level game theory into a three-level game theory, this helps 
us understand the logic of the EU in international trade negotiations. 
1.2 Question at Issue 
The question at issue is to analyse and explain how the three levels, mentioned 
above, influenced and affected the EU policymaking when negotiated the Bra 
War. The focus is therefore on the intra-EU negotiation that consists of different 
interests, raging from private interests, over the domestic interests to the European 
interest. Using the two-level game theory as a starting point is crucial, because it 
makes the interaction between the different levels visible. However, the two-level 
game theory lacks the possibility to explain a more complex system like the EU. 
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The thesis therefore expands the two-level game theory into a three-level game 
theory. The questions the thesis sets out to answer are: 
• How can the EU’s negotiation position in the Bra War be explained 
from a three-level game perspective? 
• How can the interplay between domestic, supranational and 
international, when negotiating the Bra War be understood? 
• How can the outcome of the Bra War be understood, has the Union 
been able to use its full capacity when negotiating with China, or 
was there constraints that was hindering the EU to use its full 
potential? 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Research Design 
The thesis is a case study, which tries to test and develop Putnam’s two-level 
game theory. The development of the two-level game theory is however not the 
work of the author. The improvement of the theory draws upon other scholars that 
have developed Putnam’s famous theory from 1988. Therefore the study is mainly 
testing theories. This contradicts the notion that theory-developing studies mainly 
collect a lot of material from a few cases, and that theory-testing studies collect 
little material from many cases (Esaiasson 2005:124). 
However, in being a theory testing case study, the thesis also contributes to the 
debate about the nature of the European Union, a question that has long divided 
the academic world. Alberta Sbragia distinctly defines the differences between the 
two most extreme theories. The intergovernmentalists focus on the Member States 
and the intergovernmental bargaining between them, but they neither describes 
nor do they explain the international context in which this bargaining takes place. 
In their focus on the supranational institutions, the neofactionalists explain the 
context in which the bargaining takes place, the theory however lack the 
possibility to explain the intergovernmental negotiations within the Union in a 
sufficient way (in Patterson 1997:140). Attempts have been made to combine 
these two views, they emphasis both domestic, translated through the Council Of 
Ministers, and supranational politics. However, even these attempts fall short 
when neglecting the international level and its impact upon EU policymaking. 
Using the three-level game theory the international context is also taken into 
account, the thesis will therefore hopefully contribute to some new insights about 
how the EU can be understood when participating in international negotiations 
(Patterson 1997:140). 
2.1.1 The Negotiation Framework 
When studying international negotiations it is of great importance, the thesis 
argues, to divide the negotiations into different sections. Even if these different 
sections are intertwined, dividing them brings analytical stringency to the thesis. 
The thesis first divides the negotiation setting into four different parts, the board, 
the players, the stakes and the moves. Second, these elements of the negotiations 
help explain the outcomes of the negotiation process. 
“The board” is the most basic setting in international negotiations and can in 
turn be divided into two different perspectives. First, the macro perspective of the 
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board explains the international system in which the international negotiation is 
taking place. In the macro perspective the power relations between the different 
actors are important. Second, the micro perspective is concerned with the number 
of parties and questions that are part of the negotiation (Starkey 2005:31). 
“The players” asks the question: who is participating in the negotiation? Is this 
a negotiation that is taking place on a low or high level? Even if there has been an 
increase in NGO actors in international negotiations the most common actor is 
still the nation state. Professional diplomats do much of the work on behalf of the 
nation state or groups of nation states, and the political leaders often only have a 
symbolic role to play in the negotiations (Starkey 2005:62). 
“The stakes” refer to the issue that the negotiation sets out to resolve. 
Traditionally, in negotiation theory, there has been a division between high and 
low stake issues. A high stake issue refers to negotiations concerning security; 
whereas a low stake issue refers to economical negotiations, for example trade 
negotiations. This division has long been criticized, and many scholars today 
argue that the division of high and low politics is antiquated (Starkey 2005:86ff). 
Today’s international environment is instead characterized by complex 
interdependence, in which the security sphere is intertwined with the economical, 
environmental, cultural, demographic and social sphere (Hopmann 1996:3). This 
is in line with the EU perspective, clearly stated in the European Security Strategy 
(European Council 2003). As a consequence of this the Bra War negotiations 
should be given high attention by political leaders and top civil servants. 
“The moves” are dependent on the negotiation setting, that is, the negotiators 
ability to move is in part determined by the board, the players and the stakes. 
However, given the negotiation setting the negotiator has different choices to do, 
he has to prepare a plan, choose a tactic and implement it (Starkey 2005:109). 
Traditionally different types of game theories that predict human behaviour 
have explained the moves of the negotiators. There is however a growing 
knowledge that the reality is more complex and that there is several other factors 
that must be taken into account when predicting the negotiators action. However, 
this knowledge consist a dilemma, the more variables one is adding to the 
negotiation theory the more complex the theory will be and the more difficult it 
will be to use the theory in a more generally manner. Therefore classical game 
theory can give us insights in the underlying principles of international 
negotiations (Hopmann 1996:38). As a consequence of this, the thesis at hand will 
not ad additional variables to the theory if they not create an insight that crucial 
for understanding the logic of the EU in international trade negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5 
2.2 Definitions 
In order to make the central concepts of the thesis operationally useful, one of the 
terms have to be defined. This conception is highly controversial and would 
demand an essay for it self to bring order into. As a consequence of lack of space 
the thesis will not take part in this debate, instead it will choose definitions that 
suits the purpose of the study and that are easy to conceptualize. 
When analysing the outcome of the negotiations the thesis differs between 
three definitions of the concept, defined by P. Terrence Hopmann in his book The 
Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts. First, the 
easiest way to define outcomes is to look at the mere fact that an agreement has 
been made. This definition does not take into account the actual benefits from an 
agreement, states may “seek agreements not because they produce immediate, 
concrete benefits, but because they will improve the political relationship with 
other countries.” (Hopmann 1996:28). Second, the stability of the outcomes refers 
to an agreement that does not give the negotiating parties incentives to undermine 
the agreement. Third, the efficiency of the outcome is the best agreement two 
parties can achieve jointly under the circumstances (Hopmann 1996:29). In other 
words, their optimal point at respectively party’s win-set. 
2.3 Limitations 
When studying the Bra War negotiations between the EU and China a few 
limitations have been made. First and foremost it is important to point out that this 
is mainly a study of the negotiations from a European perspective, and therefore 
the focus of the thesis will be on the intra-EU negotiations. As a consequence of 
this China will be treated as “black box”, which means that the Chinese stands in 
the negotiations will be taken for granted and something the Union has to relate 
to. This does not imply that there was not a similar process within China as the 
one that was within the EU. The assumption however is vital from an analytical 
perspective, it makes it easier to analyze and explain how the Union has created a 
stand in the negotiations and how this process can be understood. 
Second, even if the thesis adopts a European perspective on the Bra War 
negotiations there will be some limitations also at the European level. When the 
Member States construct their position on the issue at hand, there are similar 
processes as the ones within in the Union. However, the thesis assumes “that the 
primary political instrument by which individuals and groups in civil society seek 
to influence international negotiations is the nation-state, which acts externally as 
a unitary and rational actor on behalf of its constituents.” (Moravcsik 1998:22). 
Third, the EU consisted of twenty-five states during the Bra War. Every 
Member State has, for different reasons, their own stand on the issues. The thesis 
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will however not explain every stand in the EU; it will instead focus on the main 
actors of the conflict and how they try to push for their views within the Union. 
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3 Theory 
The theory chapter of this thesis expand the logic of the two-level game into the 
logic of the three-level game. In doing so, the thesis emanates from Putnam’s 
famous essay Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. 
The two-level game theory has the advantage of open up the Unions “black-
box” and focus on the interaction between different levels and actors in the 
negotiations. Using the two-level game theory when analyzing negotiations also 
helps explain the outcomes as a consequence of the negotiation process, therefore 
Putnam’s theory is used as a starting point. However, when Putnam wrote about 
the two-level game theory he did not have the EU in mind. His case study was of 
the Bonn summit conference of 1978, a conference where traditional nation states 
were the main actors. The two-level game theory therefore lacks the possibility to 
explain negotiations involving complex actor structures. When analyzing the EU’s 
actions in international negotiations it is therefore crucial to develop the two-level 
game to better fit the prerequisites of the Union. 
3.1 The Theoretical Framework 
The basic assumption of the two-level game is that central executives has a 
essential role in international negotiations, this derive from the fact that they are 
placed in the middle, between the international and the domestic sphere and they 
are therefore bound to take both these two spheres into consideration. Using 
Putnam’s metaphor; international negotiations can be seen as a negotiation 
between two tables, the first table, the level 1 table, is the table where the central 
executives who negotiate sits. The second table, the level 2 table, is the domestic 
table; every deal that is negotiated at the international table needs to be ratified at 
the domestic table. This creates a complex negotiating situation, because a deal 
that is rational at the international table does not have to be rational at the 
domestic table (Putnam 1988:434). 
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-
level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. (Putnam 1988:434). 
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Expanding Putnam’s two-level game by adding another dimension helps us 
explain a complex bargaining body such as the EU. Instead of two levels we are 
now left with three: first, the international level, second, the supranational level, 
and third, the domestic level. 
This two-level (now a three level) game metaphor that Putnam has outlined, 
provides us only with the basic assumptions on how to understand international 
negotiations. It is therefore necessary to further develop these assumptions into a 
theory of how actors participating in international negotiations will behave, in 
order to satisfy the domestic pressure and minimize the unfavourable 
consequences of international development. 
When theorizing his framework Putnam makes a distinction between two 
different bargaining processes that occur in international negotiations. First, the 
international bargaining that leads to a tentative agreement. Second, the domestic 
bargaining procedure that consists of domestic constituents how makes a decision 
about whether to ratify the agreement or not (Putnam 1988:436). In the three-level 
game the supranational level must be added to the analysis. This analytical 
division between the international and domestic bargaining process is in reality 
more complex, the need for ratification at the domestic arena will affect the 
negotiations at the international level. There is also likely to be consultations 
between the different levels throughout the negotiations process. This fact of 
interaction between the levels is called reverberation, which imply that what’s 
happening at one level reverberates at the others. (Patterson 1997:142). 
Even though Putnam takes this linkage between the different levels into 
account, he does not foresee the three-tier reverberation that can occur within the 
three-level game. The EU can be reverberated both of the international context on 
the Commission and of the international context on the Member States. In cases 
when the Member States are obliged to implement the international agreement, as 
is the case of the Bra War, it is important for the Commission to reverberate the 
Member States (Marangoni 2008:32). 
However, dividing the negotiations into three stages help us unveil the logic of 
the three-level game, it also helps us understand and define what Putnam names 
win-sets. A win-set is all possible agreements on the international level that will 
be ratified at the domestic arena (Putnam 1988:437). In other words, all possible 
alternatives that the actors in a two-level game prefers to a no agreement. 
Therefore an agreement is only possible when the win-sets of the two negotiating 
parties overlap with each other. (Putnam 1988:438). When expanding a two-level 
game into three-level game we can modify Putnam’s definition slightly by adding 
that a win-set at the domestic level is the set of all agreements at the supranational 
level that will be ratified among the domestic constituency (Patterson 1997:143). 
The other factor for why win-sets are important is because the size of the win-
set helps determine the negotiation ability for the international negotiator. The 
larger the win-set is, the more room to negotiate for the negotiator. On the other 
hand, a large win-set open up for the possibility for the other party in the 
negotiation process to push the negotiator around (Putnam 1988:440). In other 
words, the larger the win-set the greater the risk to accept a deal that is not 
favourable for the negotiator. Conversely, a smaller win-set can be used to 
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maximize the bargain advantage. “’I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could 
never get it accepted at home.’” (Putnam 1988:440). The domestic constraints on 
international negotiations can therefore provide leverage to the international 
negotiators. 
3.1.1 Determinants of the Win-Set 
The size of the win-set helps us understand the outcome of international 
negotiations, it is therefore important to understand what determines the size of 
the win set. Putnam point to three different determinants: domestic preferences 
and coalitions, domestic institutions and international negotiators strategies. 
Preferences and coalitions among domestic actors are crucial to determine the 
size of the win-set. The thesis assumes that the domestic actor will act in 
accordance with their political economical interests. The preferences and 
coalitions among domestic actors will therefore be a result of political economical 
interests. The lower the cost of a no-agreement is, the smaller the win-set will be. 
If the stakes to not agree to the issue negotiated is low there will be less 
incitement for the domestic sphere to close an agreement (Putnam 1988:442). 
However, the domestic sphere is often no unity. There can be big differences 
between domestic groups, but even in homogenous societies there is not always a 
consensus for how hard to push for an agreement, even though the different 
groups push for the same agreement. In other words, the groups differ to the 
extent they are willing to risk a no-agreement (Putnam 1988:443f). 
The negotiator is facing a different task when dealing with a heterogeneous 
constituency, here he can not using the tactic the more the better. This instead 
opens up for a greater possibility of international cooperation (Putnam 1988:444). 
For example, consider two different distributions of constituents’ preferences as 
between three alternatives: A, B, and no-agreement. If 45 percent of the constituents 
rank these A > no-agreement > B, 45 percent rank them B > no-agreement > A, and 
10 percent rank them B > A > no-agreement, then both A and B are in the win-set, 
even though B would win in a simple Level-II-only game. On the other hand, if 90 
percent rank the alternatives A > no-agreement > B, while 10 percent still rank them 
B > A > no-agreement, then only A is in the win-set. In this sense, a government that 
is internally divided is more likely to be able to strike a deal than one that is firmly 
committed to a single policy.(Putnam 1988:444f). 
In the Bra War the Council of the European Union ratified the agreement between 
the chief-negotiator of the Commission and the Chinese chief-negotiator. As will 
be seen further down, the European chief-negotiator faced a heterogeneous 
constituency. In the case of a heterogeneous constituency the distribution of 
power between the supranational and the domestic levels helps the union improve 
its win-set in international negotiations (Bonvicini 2008:7). 
The other important factor that affects the win-set is the construction of the 
ratification procedure at the domestic level (Putnam 1988:448). However, when 
  10 
expanded to a three-level game it is important to take into account the institutions 
at both the domestic and supranational level. 
The most obvious example of how the political institutions affect the size of 
the win-set is the ratification procedure in the United States, which is constructed 
from the principle of power sharing. In the American Senate one third of the 
senators can block any agreement at the international level. This give the 
American negotiators an advantage in international negotiations, they can always 
refer back to the domestic level when facing a draft they don’t like. At the same 
time this is limiting the possibility for international cooperation. Conversely, the 
greater autonomy a states central decision maker has, the bigger the win-set is and 
the greater the possibilities for international cooperation. 
The two-level game theory predicts, and so does the three-level game theory, 
that autonomous negotiators at the international level will result in a weaker 
relative bargaining power (Putnam 1988:449). This assumption poses a dilemma 
for the negotiator at the international arena. The dilemma rests on the assumption 
that the negotiator wants to strike a deal at the international level, which is easier 
with larger win-sets. At the same time the negotiator wants to have good 
bargaining position vis-à-vis his counterpart, as a consequence of his will to 
please the domestic level (Putnam 1988:450). Here the EU proves a great deal of 
flexibility, the Council gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate, and this 
mandate is different depending on the question at issue. In questions that are 
important for the Member States the Commission is given a mandate with little 
room for own initiatives and vice-versa. This fact gives the Union the possibility 
to alter their win-sets depending on the situation. 
3.1.2 Relaxing the Assumptions 
The most usual foundation when studying international negotiations is the game 
theoretical approach. This foundation can give us a lot of insights in the 
negotiation process, even though the game theoretical framework is over 
simplistic. When using the three-level game there is several assumptions that most 
game theories makes that has consequences for the negotiating process. This 
chapter relax some of the assumptions in order to better understand the EU’s 
negotiation process. 
One major assumption in game theory is the assumption of perfect 
information. If this assumption is relaxed it will have implications on the 
negotiations, most notably on the win-sets. If there is no such thing as perfect 
information, which there is not, we can assume that the negotiators are more 
knowledgeable of their own win-sets than their opponents. This uncertainty puts 
the negotiator in the position of the possibility to “manipulate” his own win-set. In 
other words, a successful negotiator is one that can convince the negotiator on the 
opposite side that the agreement at hand will be ratified by the domestic sphere, 
but that an agreement that is just a little more favourable for the opponent will not 
(Putnam 1988:453). 
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The other assumption that is made in game theoretical approaches is that the 
structure of the issue or issues to be negotiated is known in advance, the same 
goes for the payoffs of the agreements. This however is a simplification of reality; 
in real bargaining situations the negotiators of one side tries to reverberate their 
opponents that the costs of a no-agreement and the benefits of the agreement at 
hand are much higher (Putnam 1988:454). 
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4 The Negotiation Setting 
When analyzing the Bra War negotiations it is important to first bring order into 
the negotiation setting. In order to do so, the thesis will use the four-step model 
described above. The different sections should not be viewed as isolated islands; 
they interact with each other in a highly complex manner. This way of dividing 
the negotiations is for analytical purpose since it brings analytical stringency to 
the thesis. The analysis of the negotiations through the glasses of the three-level 
game theory will be done throughout these four phases. However, in order to 
bring order to the negotiation setting it is necessary to start with a short 
background to the conflict. 
4.1 Background 
The textile and clothing sector has traditionally been one of the least liberalised and 
most highly protected industries in the international economy. Treated as a special 
case, this sector was exempt from most trans-industry regulations developed under 
the auspices of the GATT/WTO. (European Commission 2004:259). 
In 1972 the negotiations of a Multifibre Agreement (MFA) started, an agreement 
that went into force in the beginning of 1974. The MFA was renegotiated several 
times; the last agreement was the MFA IV, which expired in 1994. The MFA was 
a so-called umbrella agreement, which gave the governments the possibility to 
negotiate bilateral agreement on quotas, this opened up for the possibility to 
discriminate between different trading partners, something that is not possible in 
the GATT where the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle is applied.1 
The MFA agreements was a way for countries with domestic textile and 
clothing industry to restrain those countries that had a comparative advantage in 
the T/C industry, most notably China and India, from their domestic markets. On 
top of the discrimination that the MFA implied, India and China was subject to 
additional discrimination through the bilateral agreements that were signed with 
them. For example, the first agreement between the European Community (EC) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The Most Favoured Nation principle refers to the first article of the GATT, 
which stipulates that countries cannot discriminate between trading partners. 
Grant a trading partner a favour (for example lower tariffs), and that will have to 
apply for all WTO members. 
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and China gave the EC the right to suspend all imports from China in a certain 
product if the price of that product fell below a certain level (Strange 1998:68). 
However, when the MFA IV expired it was replaced with the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). The purpose was to organise T/C under a normal 
WTO regime after a transition period, which ended last of December 2004 
(Landau 2004:76). 
The ATC was concluded at the Uruguay Round in 1994, but even if the 
purpose was to phase-out quantitative restrictions by the end of 2004, the reality 
were another. Little was done to phase-out the quotas, and therefore, in the 
beginning of 2005, the result was just the kind of “big-bang” effect that ATC had 
tried to avoid. In the phase-out period the countries were allowed to chose which 
quotas they wanted to remove and when, the agreement only stipulated that the 
quotas should disappear before 2005. The EU chose to adopt a protectionist 
approach and kept 167 out of 218 quotas until the end of 2004, among those the 
most sensitive quotas, such as t-shirts, jeans and underwear (Comino 2007:823). 
This was a way for the Union to postpone the liberalisation of the T/C sector, in 
other words to postpone the conflict with the T/C industry. 
4.1.1 The Chinese Accession to the WTO 
The next big event leading up to the Bra War in 2005 was the Chinese accession 
to the WTO, which occurred in December 2001. The negotiations of the Chinese 
accession to the WTO were long and complex, especially the reluctance from the 
WTO members to grant China the status of development country delayed the 
accession process. The EU, together with the United States, was concerned about 
the growing trade deficit vis-à-vis China,2 a concern that resulted in the EU 
insisting on safeguard measures against China, so called WTO plus restrictions 
(Comino 2007:823). These safeguards measures, that the EU and the U.S. insisted 
on, is important for understanding the Bra War, its therefore important to examine 
the Chinese Accession Protocol closer. 
Paragraph 242 in the Chinese Accession Protocol and the Report of the 
Working Party provides for special safeguards measures in T/C against China. 
Paragraph 242 is vague in its conditions for implementing the safeguards and 
therefore leaves much room for interpretation. 
In the event that a WTO Member believed that imports of Chinese origin of textiles 
and apparel products covered by the ATC as of the date the WTO Agreement 
entered into force, were, due to market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly 
development of trade in these products, such Member could request consultations 
with China with a view to easing or avoiding such market disruption. (World Trade 
Organization 2001:242(a)). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 The EU’s trade deficit towards China has grown from close to zero in the early 
1980s to 106 billion euro in 2005, and the deficit is steadily increasing. 
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Paragraph 242 was “incorporated into EC law by Council Regulation (EC) No 
138/2003, in the form of a new Article 10a inserted in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3030/93” (European Commission 2005a). The new Article 10a was almost 
transcribed word by word from paragraph 242 in Chinas Accession Protocol. 
However, the Chinese Accession Protocol does not define what is meant with the 
threat “to impede the orderly development of trade”, as a main indicator for this 
development the Commission therefore decided to take into account “the 
existence of a rapid rise or surge in imports, in absolute or relative terms.” 
(European Commission 2005a). Its interesting to notice that this definition of 
phrase in the Chinese Accession Protocol is dated to April 27th 2005, this was the 
time when the quotas towards China had been dropped and the EU felt an increase 
in imports from China and the pressure from some Member States and the T/C 
industry rose. 
The Commission also states that it is not only the effect on the EU industry 
that can give rise to safeguard measures. Another relevant factor is the effect on 
traditional suppliers of textile to the EU that  ”…are part of the natural zone of 
competitiveness of the EU textile and clothing industry…” (European 
Commission 2005a). As Anna Comino correctly has pointed out, this was a way 
for the Commission to make safeguard measures more justifiable, now the Unions 
own industry did not need to be affected, which was also the case. In 2005 the 
absolute volumes of import to EU did hardly change, what had changed though 
was a dramatic shift in markets share in Chinese favour (Comino 2007:825). 
4.2 The Board 
On December 31 2004 the import quotas against China expired, this led to new 
import patterns for the EU. The heavily increased imports of T/C from China to 
the EU resulted in complains from the European T/C industry and some of the 
Member States that had a large T/C sector. 
The two actors in the Bra War dispute are both important actors concerning 
trade in T/C. Chinas export of T/C has grown rapidly; in 1994 the country was the 
world’s largest exporter of clothing and the second largest exporter of textiles. 
Already in 2002 when China started to benefit from the WTO accession, the 
Chinese export in T/C increased heavily, by 46% in value and by 192% in volume 
(Comino 2007:827). China has two main competitive advantages in the T/C 
sector. First, the labour costs situation in China is low compared to the rest of the 
world. Even though China cannot compete with other Asian countries in low 
wages, their quality/price ratio is much lower when “productivity, reliability and 
indirect costs are brought into the picture.” (Institut Français de la mode 
2004:177). Second, the Chines T/C industry is, compared to many other countries 
T/C industry, fully integrated. This means that the supply chain is not dependent 
on third country (Institut Français de la mode 2004:177). 
The importance of the T/C industry for the Chinese economy also makes the 
sector a top priority for the government. The T/C sector represented 10% of the 
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Chinese economy, and the growth rate in Chinese T/C industry has grown steadily 
since 1995 with an average rate of 8% per year. The 2005 quota removal was 
therefore a question of high interest for the Chinese government (Institut Français 
de la mode 2004:172). 
If China can be characterised as the rising star in the T/C industry, the 
situation is the opposite for the countries in the EU. 
The current situation of EU T/C industry is characterised by an ongoing 
deterioration of competitiveness vis-à-vis increasing extra-EU imports of finished 
and semi-finished products, accompanied by a deterioration of production volumes 
and employment.(Institut Français de la mode 2004:8). 
The T/C industry in the EU is affected negatively by the increased competition 
from third country, especially China. There are three main reasons for this threat 
against the European T/C industry. First there is a growing concentration on 
branding within the EU, this conduct the whole production chain to look for new 
strategies to increase gross margins. The strategy often adopted is an outsourcing 
to cheaper countries. Second, the third country competitors is getting better, they 
improve their level of service and quality. Third, the T/C industry within the EU 
has failed to build a competitive advantage vis-à-vis third country. The products 
produced in the EU are not differentiated enough from the products produced in 
third country, therefore there is no incentive for the retail industry to buy products 
from the European market(Institut Français de la mode 2004:8). 
However, even if the EU is feeling the increasing competitiveness in the T/C 
sector the Union is still the second largest exporter in textiles and the worlds 
largest exporter of cloths today, it also constitute the single largest market for T/C 
today(EURATEX 2009). 
Another important consideration to take into account is the EU’s large trade 
deficit in T/C towards China. In 2002 the trade deficit in T/C was 30 billion 
Euros, which is almost a double of the trade deficit in 1995, and accounts for 41% 
of the total trade deficit(Institut Français de la mode 2004:13). The removal of the 
quotas would of course increase the trade deficit towards China, which in turn 
creates an even bigger dependence on China, something that worried the Union. 
4.3 The Players 
In order to understand the players of the negotiation it is important to have 
knowledge about the Unions Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The CCP is 
often seen as a stronghold for the European Community. But even though the 
Commission has the right to negotiate and conclude agreements on behalf of the 
Community (Europe 2009), the Member States has preserved the possibility to 
lobby national interests (Elsig 2002:25). The Treaty on EU (TEU) concludes that 
the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council concerning future 
negotiations. The Council should thereafter authorise the Commission to open the 
negotiations. However, the Council shall conduct the negotiation in consultation 
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with a special committee, called the 133 committee, appointed by the Council 
(ToN Article 133:3). Below, the thesis will examine the decision-making process 
in the CCP, thereafter it will further investigate the different players in the Union 
that acted during the Bra war negotiations. 
4.3.1 The Decision-Making Process During the Bra War 
When the EU negotiated the Bra War, the Commission had exclusive competence. 
This means that the Commission is the sole negotiator on behalf of the 
Community, and that the Member States are obliged to follow the decision taken 
at the Community level (Marangoni 2008:30). 
The Commission initiates proposals to the General Affairs Council (GAC), the 
GAC then gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the 
Community. During the whole negotiating process the Commission is obliged to 
consult the 133 committee, which in turn provide the Commission assistance 
during the negotiation process. The GAC can also give the Commission new 
directives during the entire negotiations process. After the negotiations the GAC 
adopt the agreement, which the Commission later sign. After signing the 
agreement the Commission asks the GAC to ratify the agreement through 
qualified majority voting (QMV). During this process the European Parliament 
(EP) has little to say and are only consulted by the Commission (Elsig 2002:32). 
Due to the EP’s limited role during the Bra War negotiations it will be left out 
from the analysis. 
As understood above the decision to ratify a CCP agreement or not is decided 
within the Community, formally the domestic constituency has nothing to say 
concerning CCP matters. However, the importance of the domestic level cannot 
be overemphasized, as will be shown further down the Bra War affected many 
people within Europe, and sooner or later the governments will face an election 
within their country. Therefore the Member States can be seen as the extension of 
the domestic constituency (Patterson 1997:147).  
Even though the voting is done by QMV, the norm of consensus in the Union 
is very strong. Despite this, the use of QMV in trade issues has “biased trade 
policy outcomes against protectionism by reducing the ability of individual 
Member States – and the business interests that lobby them – to hold the process 
hostage to specific protectionist demands.” (Aggarwal 2004:29). Some argue that 
the European bargaining machinery puts the EU in a bad bargaining position vis-
à-vis its counterpart. The Commission has to balance between the opinions of 
different Member States to avoid a protectionist backlash. This gives the 
counterpart the possibility to play actors within the Union of against each other 
(Marangoni 2008:32). However, as Aggarwal points out the institutional 
construction of the Union together with the use of QMV can also give the 
Commission a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis its counterpart. Using 
Putnam’s terminology, the ratification process gives the Union a win-set that can 
approve their bargaining position. 
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4.3.2 The European Commission 
At the supranational level the European Commission and its Directorate General 
for trade (DG trade) are the main actors. The trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson was the person responsible for negotiating the Bra War. The European 
Community’s exclusive competence in trade issues gives the Commission in 
general, and Mandelson in specific a crucial role in the negotiations. The DG for 
trade was clear that the removal of quotas would increase productivity in the T/C 
sector and decrease the prices for the consumers. Peter Mandelson also said he is 
an advocator for a more liberalized market in T/C and that he wanted the MFA to 
end so that China can benefit from its WTO membership (Mandelson 2005). 
However, the main objective in 2005 for the trade Commissioner and the DG 
for trade was to allow for a smooth transition to quota free environment in T/C, 
”as well as reacting in a proportionate and WTO compatible manner in case of 
serious market disruption.” (European Commission 2006:13). This shows that 
even if the Commissioner together with his Directorate General was strong 
advocators for a liberalization of the T/C-sector, they had to take other factors into 
consideration, such as European competitiveness, industrial policy and regional 
policy, Mandelson himself express this clearly in his speech in Beijing 2005. 
“… I operate in the sphere of practical politics not pure economic theory. I have to 
recognise and manage public pressures, and try to reconcile them when they clash.” 
(Mandelson 2005). 
This statement of trade Commissioner Mandelson shows the interplay between 
international, supranational and domestic. The Commission tries to pursue both 
the Community interest as well as the domestic, at the same time as they try to 
“minimize the adverse consequences of foreign development.” (Putnam 
1988:434). The Community interest in the Bra War is correlating with the Chinese 
interest, i.e. to remove the quotas. However, the Commission understood that they 
had to satisfy the domestic pressure within the Union and therefore initiated 
consultation with Beijing. 
4.3.3 The Member States 
The Member Sates has the possibility to impose influence on the negotiation 
process through the GAC, they are also special in the sense that their role with in 
the Union is divided. First, the Member States tries to pursue their domestic 
interests within the Union. Second, and simultaneously they try to work towards 
cooperative integration (Patterson 1997:141). Because of this the Member States 
stance in the Bra War is important to examine. 
The differences between the Member States T/C industry helps explain much 
of the difficulties in finding a common stance vis-à-vis China during the Bra War. 
There was a clear division between the northern and the southern countries during 
the Bra War. The southern countries, notably Italy, France and Spain all have big 
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T/C industries that have felt the increasing competition from China. The quota 
removal in the beginning of 2005 further increased the competition from China. 
The Spanish spinning industry was most affected by the quota removal and 
there was little possibility for upgrading the industry since the market in high end 
products was dominated by Italy (Comino 2007:829). The Italian T/C industry 
risked a lot from the Chinese competition; in 2006 Italy had almost 600,000 jobs 
in the T/C sector, which is about one quarter of the EU-25 total number of 
employers in the T/C industry. However, the trend was clear, competition from 
China and other low cost countries added to the sharp decline in both employment 
and financial contribution to the Italian economy (The Economist 2006). 
The northern countries, notably Germany, Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries, had the opposite view on the quota removal. They all had strong retail 
industries, which benefits from cheap Chinese imports (Comino 2007:829). The 
statement of the Danish prime minister after the negotiations illustrates the 
northern countries view on the issue. “I believe the agreement to limit Chinese 
exports to the EU does not take into account the realities of modern international 
commerce." (quoted in: Financial Times 2005a). 
The statistics concerning the T/C industry further strengthen the picture. The 
T/C sector represented 6 percent of the Italian GDP and 10.6 percent of its export 
in 2000 and 2001. In Spain and France the figures are lower, but compared to 
their Nordic counterparts the T/C sector accounts for a much higher part of the 
domestic GDP. For example in the Netherlands the T/C sector accounted for only 
1 percent of the GDP and 2.5 percent of the export those years. Looking at the 
employment statistics we see the same pattern, in France, Italy and Spain the 
employment, as a percent of the total manufacturing employment, constituted 5.3, 
12.8 and 9.4 percent respectively in 2001, compared to Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden where the employment ratio was only 2.6, 2.9 and 1.7 respectively 
(Institut Français de la mode 2004:25). 
The constituency that faced the European Commission was not homogenous 
but heterogeneous. In their attempt to influence the negotiating process the 
southern countries were much more successful. Why this is true is only possible to 
speculate in. One likely explanation though, is that the costs of the negotiations 
were concentrated to the southern countries, it is therefore reasonable to think that 
they will gain most of the influence over the ratification process (Putnam 
1988:445). 
However, using Putnam’s theory of the heterogeneous constituency, this imply 
that an agreement is much more likely to be achieved (Putnam 1988:444). The 
fact that some countries in the EU opposed initiations of new quotas, and that the 
Commissioner Mandelson was explicitly in favour of liberalized T/C trade, 
resulted in a situation where the Commissions negotiator found allies at the 
Chinese side. This may have helped moderate the size of the new quotas that were 
imposed. 
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4.3.4 The Interest Groups 
Especially one interest group was engaged in the work to influence the Bra War 
negotiations: the European Apparel and Textile Organisation (EURATEX). 
EURATEX consists of different domestic T/C associations from the Member 
States, and its “main objective is to promote the interests of its members while 
taking into account the European Union's institutional framework and its 
international obligations.” (EURATEX 2009). 
The EURATEX was critical of the quota removal in 2005 because of the 
threat it imposed on its members. From the perspective of the T/C industry there 
was reasons to be worried, the European market felt a sharp increase in imports 
from China, which threatened the European T/C industry. During the first 8 
months of 2005 the Chinese exports to the EU rose with 40% (Financial Times 
2005b). 
There are possibilities for the interest groups to work toward their interests 
both at the domestic and the European level. At the European level they use 
general EU objectives in their rhetoric, such as job creation and growth, to 
legitimize their demands. At the domestic level they talk about the consequences 
of liberalisation of the market, such as unemployment and socio-economical 
difficulties. At the Community level, the civil servants are keen to listen to the 
sector interests, because they know that they affect the domestic level, which later 
is important for ratifying the agreement reached at the international level 
(Marangoni 2008:31). The possibility for interest groups to affect the negotiations 
from two directions makes the sector interests more important in the EU than 
elsewhere. 
4.4 The Stakes 
The importance of the quota removal for the EU and China is not easy to 
determine. However there are some indicators that can help us to better 
understand the stakes for the involved parts in the negotiation. These indicators 
can be divided into two spheres, the domestic and the supranational, of course 
these two spheres interact with each other, the division is mainly for analytical 
purpose. 
4.4.1 The Domestic Level 
As shown above the Member States were divided about whether to remove the 
quotas or not. The question was important because it threatened the T/C industry 
within Europe. The countries that had a large T/C sector where many were 
employed and that constituted a large part of the countries GDP, felt of course 
more threatened than the others. This dose not means that the countries within the 
Union that lacked a large T/C industry did not care about the question at issue. As 
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described above, the northern countries had a large retail industry, which 
benefitted from a quota removal. 
Even though the importance of the T/C industry during a long time has 
declined the EU was still the second largest exporter in the world in 2005, the fact 
that Europe has a long tradition in T/C production also makes the sector 
associated with economic and social interests (Marangoni 2008:31). It should 
however be noted that the EU was not the big loser of the quota removal, even if 
the Chinese imports to the Union rose by 40% in the first eight months, the overall 
import of T/C to EU rose by only 2.1% (Comino 2007:828). The countries that 
lost were small developing countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Mauritius and some North African countries and Turkey, all with no possibility to 
compete with China and India in a liberalized trade atmosphere. During the MFA 
the developing countries had preferential agreements with the EU, agreements 
that had enabled them to compete with China and India (Comino 2007:822). 
As described above the T/C industry is a key sector for Chinese economy; the 
importance of the question at issue was therefore high. At the other hand the 
Chinese government were well aware that the Chinese Accession Protocol to the 
WTO allowed the EU to undertake safeguard measures. They therefore 
understood that the best they could do was to engage in talks with the Union and 
that way affect the size of the safeguard measures. 
4.4.2 The Supranational Level 
At the supranational sphere, besides the domestic concerns, the issue brought up 
other concerns. The quota removal in January 2005 implied the start of a 
balancing act, especially for trade Commissioner Peter Mandeson. On one hand 
the Commission was keen to reduce the concerns within the Union over the rising 
Chinese imports. On the other hand, Mandelson did not want the Unions relation 
with China to deteriorate. Conversely to the United States, who had imposed new 
quotas upon China without consultations, he understood the importance to keep 
good relation with Beijing. The Commission, through Mandelson, therefore tried 
to engage in talks with Beijing concerning safeguard measures (Comino 
2007:831). 
4.5 The Moves 
When analyzing the moves of the negotiations it is important to keep in mind that 
the Bra War negotiations was divided into two parts: the first part ranging from 
January 1 2005 to June 10th 2005, and the second part ranging from June 11th 
2005 to September 5th 2005. These two phases of the negotiation was different in 
many respects, it is therefore important to analyze them separately. 
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4.5.1 The First Phase 
Even though the EU had known since 1995 that the quotas would end in 2005, the 
Union was ill prepared for the new reality, and a state of chock was to be felt 
throughout the Union, when the quotas disappeared. Conversely, China was well 
prepared for the quota removal and saw a chance to fully exploit their full 
potential (Comino 2007:830). 
The EU had however one trump card; according to the Chinese Accession 
Protocol to the WTO, described in detail above, the Union had the right to impose 
new quotas if there was a risk of market disruption and the orderly development 
of trade was impeded (World Trade Organization 2001:242(a)). At the same time 
the EU did not want to disturb the relations with the Chinese government and 
therefore felt forced to engage in talks with China. The T/C industry, represented 
through EURATEX, was also very active in putting pressure on the Commission. 
On March 9th the EURATEX filed a request on safeguards concerning twelve 
categories of products in order to limit the danger that the Chinese producers 
imposed on producers of the “Pan Euro Mediterranean area” (EURATEX 2005a). 
They were also engaged in several talks with trade Commissioner Mandelson and 
other persons within the Commission (EURATEX 2005b, 2005c). 
At April 6th the Commission created guidelines that established alert zones in 
all categories of Chinese T/C imports. If these alert zones was exceeded the 
Commission or the Member States could take initiative to undertake 
investigations, which in turn would lead to informal consultations with the 
Chinese government to solve the problem. However, if China does not solve the 
problem, “formal WTO consultations with the Chinese authorities would require 
them to act to limit textiles exports in the affected categories.” (European 
Commission 2005b). 
The Commission sought to soothe Member States and the T/C industry, and at 
the same time avoid upsetting Beijing, at this point the Commission did not bow 
to the pressure from the T/C industry that wanted more drastic action. Despite this 
act of balance, the alert zone measures made the Chinese government react 
negatively. A Chinese Commerce Ministry spokesman said that “This departs 
from the spirit of free trade proposed by Europe and seriously violates the basic 
principles of the World Trade Organization.” (quoted in Deutsche Welle 2005). 
At April 24th the alert zones in some product categories were exceeded, this 
led to trade Commissioner Mandelsons request to authorise him to investigate if 
safeguard measures should be imposed upon these categories (European 
Commission 2005c). The request for authorisation by Mr Mandelson was a 
consequence of increased pressure from the Italian, Spanish and France 
governments. When the investigation was over the Commission requested formal 
consultations with the Chinese government concerning two product categories 
(Comino 2007:831). The EU’s request for formal consultations to resolve the 
dispute, resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding at June 10th 2005, also 
referred to as the Shanghai agreement. The agreement concluded that the rates of 
imports would be adjusted upwards in 2006 and 2007 in order to provide for a 
smooth transition to a full liberalisation in 2008 (European Commission 2005d). 
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The speech by trade Commissioner Mandelsons shows the attempt balance 
between the Member States on the one side and China on the other side. 
The explosion in imports of Chinese textiles and clothing has created alarm in many 
European Member States, and the issue has threatened to mushroom into a major 
trade dispute between Europe and China. …I had to propose action to manage what 
was becoming a combustible situation in a number of our Member States. I am a 
believer in free trade. But I am equally sensitive to the need to be able to adjust and 
find transitional arrangements in the event of sudden developments and unexpected 
shocks. …Today’s agreement is a significant demonstration that China is entering 
the global economy as a responsible and valued partner. (Mandelson 2005b). 
The Chinese Commerce Minister also thanked the EU for “the EU’s sincerity in 
solving trade disputes with China through dialogue and consultation, instead of 
taking unilateral action". (quoted in The Economist 2005). This was a clear swipe 
to the United States that had taken unilateral action. 
The Shanghai agreement covers ten out of 35 categories, it is only possible to 
speculate in what influence the EURATEX had on the EU standpoint, but it is 
worth noting that the Memorandum of Understanding states that the agreement 
includes “most of the categories identified by the European Textile Association 
Euratex.” (European Commission 2005e). The EURATEX was very active and 
critical during the Bra War, which further strengthens the picture that the 
EURATEX was an important actor. Some will argue that the acting of EURATEX 
weakens the Unions image both internally because the Union is “surrendering EU 
companies and jobs without a fight.” (EURATEX 2005d) and externally, because 
its promotion of free trade can be questioned (Marangoni 2008:32). 
The first agreement in the Bra War was facilitated by reverberation among the 
different levels. A window of opportunity for the Commission facilitated the 
Memorandum of Understanding that was signed June 10th 2005. The specific 
safeguard clause in the Chinese Accession Protocol to the WTO (the international 
level) together with the alert zones issued by the Commission (the Community 
level) created this window of opportunity. This three-tier reverberation affected 
the Unions possibility to act, which in turn led to an agreement with China. 
(Marangoni 2008:31f.). In other words, the Chinese Accession Protocol 
reverberated the Commission to the extent that the Commission felt forced to 
initiate the alert levels, which in turn affected the Member States as a result of the 
their obligation to monitor the alert zones. 
However, even if both the Chinese and the European authorities were happy 
about the agreement concluded in June, it created a split between the Member 
States. The French foreign minister welcomed the Shanghai agreement (The 
Economist 2005). On the other side the Danish Prime Minister said, “in the end, 
[the agreement] will not save one job for European industry” (quoted in Comino 
2007:830). 
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4.5.2 The Second Phase 
The Shanghai agreement was of limited use due to the Commissions inability to 
adopt the agreement on time. It took until July 8th before the Commission adopted 
Regulation 1084/2005 into Regulation No. 3030/93. The retail industry saw this 
loophole and placed huge orders of T/C from China. The Regulation 
No.1084/2005 clearly stipulates that the quantities ordered between June 11th 
2005 and July 12th 2005 should not be restricted on the grounds that there are no 
quantities available within the 2005 limits, all products shipped after the June 11th 
2005 will however be counted against the quantitative limits of 2005 (European 
Commission 2005f). This contradictory statement together with the huge orders 
placed by the retail industry explains why 75 million Chinese garments were 
blocked in European harbours; the import licenses had within a few weeks been 
exceeded (Comino 2007:832f). 
The Commissions inability to adopt the Memorandum of Understanding 
resulted in an unstable agreement. This gave some of the parties incentive to 
undermine the agreement. (Hopmann 1996:29), the northern countries defended 
the retail industries right to place huge orders for T/C (Comino 2007:832). 
The blocked garment in European ports lead to a widening of the split between 
the Member States, the southern countries argued that the quotas from the 
Shanghai agreement should not be enlarged. Conversely, the northern countries 
argued that the blocked garment should quickly be released. The UK Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Mr Gordon Brown, was most explicit in his critic of the 
southern countries: 
The new protectionism we are seeing, however well intentioned, is a wake-up call 
because it is the last stand from those who believe we can stop the clock, postpone 
or prevent inevitable change. It is easy - as has happened in the last few weeks over 
Chinese imports - to complain about Asia's role in the world economy as a race to 
the bottom. Chinese wages are just 5 per cent of those in Europe. But my visits to 
Asia, especially to China, have convinced me that Asia is in no doubt that it is in a 
race to the top… (Brown 2005). 
The European level was now facing criticism from two directions: first, their 
interventions against the Chinese T/C export had been to slow, and thereby the 
European T/C industry had already been injured. Second, the interventions that 
was made by the Commission was to harsh, thus harming other sectors of the 
industry (Mandelson 2005). 
In the end of July the Commission observed the problem and made proposals 
to the Member States and engaged in talks with the Chinese authorities, there was 
however impossible to come to an agreement between the Member States and the 
Chinese government. The trade Commissioner Mandelson tried to solve the 
situation through a balancing act, he proposed that the goods that were blocked in 
the ports should be unblocked. At the same time he stated that the Commissions 
primary interest was to “preserve the original overall agreement.” (European 
Commission 2005g). In other words, that the imports that had been done should 
be counted upon the 2005 quantities. This statement from the trade Commissioner 
  24 
was supported by the T/C industry, even though they were sceptical to the 
agreement made in June 2005 (EURATEX 2005e, 2005f). 
The balancing act was not successful, even if an agreement was signed after a 
few days of negotiations, it stated that both the EU and China will take charge of 
the goods that were blocked in the European harbours up to September 5th 
(European Commission 2005h). The Industry immediately voiced concerns and 
said that the proposal would handicap the European producers. They were of the 
opinion that the fundamentals of the situation had not changed since the June 10th 
and therefore there was no reason to change the content of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (EURATEX 2005g).  
The GAC represents the link between the supranational and domestic level, 
because they represents the interests of the Member States at the Community 
level. The situation that had occurred as a consequence of the late adoption of the 
Shanghai agreement led to a collective pressure from the Member States, through 
the GAC, on the Commission to solve the embarrassing situation. The fact that the 
Union had put it self in this embarrassing position helps explain why the southern 
countries, that strongly advocated the safeguard measures from June 10th, 
accepted the new deal (Comino 2007:833f). There is however a paradox that the 
Commission in the end asked the Chinese government to soften the safeguards 
that was imposed on the Chinese T/C sector a few months earlier (Marangoni 
2008:33). 
The second phase of the Bra War dispute shows the problem for the EU to 
coordinate the different interests within the Union. However, the EU’s multitude 
of interests is nothing specific for the Union, conflicting interests certainly exists 
within any nation-state. Some argue that the EU’s different levels will obstruct the 
possibilities for the Union to deal with a country like China, where a “decisive, 
coherent and convincing response” is required (Comino 2007:834). Conversely, 
the three-level game theory propose another interpretation of the dispute, the more 
heterogeneous the constituency is the greater the possibility for substantive reform 
that is beneficial for all parts. The outcome of the Bra War negotiations was 
optimal in the sense that it secured some of the interests of the European T/C 
industry, and at the same time the good relationship with China was maintained. 
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5 Conclusions 
In analyzing the Bra War through the glasses of the three-level game theory the 
thesis has shown how the international, supranational and domestic level is 
interacting with each other. There is however a few more specific points that can 
be made from the analysis. 
First, the higher the cost of a no-agreement the more likely it is that an 
agreement will pass. Considered that a no-agreement in the case of the Bra War 
was a situation where the EU had imposed quotas upon China without 
consultations. This would have damaged the Unions relations with Beijing; 
therefore the stakes were high for the EU, and an agreement that both sides could 
be satisfied with were necessary. The conclusion of the two agreements was made 
easier by the fact that the Union was facing a heterogeneous constituency. 
Second, the outcome of the negotiations is affected by the power of the 
different interests represented within the negotiations. Between the first and the 
second phase the power relations had shifted. The Commissions inability to adopt 
the Shanghai agreement was embarrassing for the Union, and therefore it was 
more important for the southern countries to save the Unions credibility than 
sticking to the first agreement. 
Third, the fact that the chief negotiator of the Commission was faced with a 
heterogeneous constituency made it easier to agree upon a substantive reform. 
Taking into account that the European interest was threefold; first, southern 
Member States wanted to protect its T/C industry, second, the northern Member 
States wanted to benefit from he quota removal, third, the Union did not want to 
ruin its relation with Beijing. The diversity within the Union forced consultation 
between the Member States to solve the problem, this led to a compromise that 
took both the northern and the southern countries demands into considerations, 
and at the same time satisfied the Community interest to maintain the good 
relations with Beijing. The Unions win-set thereby overlapped the Chinese win-
set to greater extent, that would have been the case if the chief negotiator of the 
Commission had faced a protectionist constituency. 
Fourth, adding an extra level to the analysis makes the interplay between the 
levels more complex. Interests organisations with in the European Union have 
several ways to influence the decision-making process. First, they affect the 
process throw consultation with the domestic constituency. Second, they can 
insert influence on the supranational level. As shown above, these types of 
influence often differentiate from each other. The interest groups have learned 
which buttons to press and when. 
Fifth, the study of the Bra War shows that international politic reverberate 
both the supranational and the domestic level. This leads us to the conclusion that 
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domestic and supranational politics cannot be studied independently from 
international politics. 
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